I was thinking about using graphene OS, but I’ve read some lemmy users dislike this OS due to perceived misleading advertising and the pixel 7a you’re supposed to install graphene on because it’s from google (an advertising company).
Another option would be lineage OS, but there is so much false information about this OS, namely compatible phones that simply don’t work with this OS and no support.
what works for you? I want a phone with no google, that doesn’t force me to use the manufacturer’s ecosystem and that won’t show the apps I don’t want or need (on an asus I own you cannot neither get rid nor hide bloatware)
I like grapheneos, very close to stock android without google shit
Lineage is kinda bad privacy and security wise, from the little I know its not fully degoogled
My understanding is kinda the opposite:
Both GrapheneOS and LineageOS publish monthly updates with upstream security patches for all supported devices.
Both GrapheneOS use network-provided DNS by default.
Apparently both GrapheneOS and LineageOS connect to connectivitytest.gstatic.com via http as a Captive Portal test by default,althoughh this was as of 2019-2020 and both might have changed since then.
Most of this is right, but needs some things corrected.
LOS is kept up by individual maintainers of the devices, and so it can cover more of them. But that also means you expand your attack surface to lineage, maintainer, microg, etc. And that’s just on supported devices. Unofficial devices are even more wild-west, having much delayed releases, OS updates, security updates, everything.
Not only that, but Lineage requires that you unlock your bootloader and often have your phone rooted to be able to do everything. This introduces special points of insecurity and possible issues in the future.
GOS is from a single source, for a single line of phones, and uses a designed method to load cryptographically signed ROMs onto the device, and then validate updates using the same method. The Play Services are sandboxed and disabled by default, so you can just never use them if you want. Overall, this makes for a more cohesive device. One that is more private and more secure. Especially so, when you can buy a new Pixel device and have guaranteed updates for as long as Google will do so for the same device.
the play services are not installed by default*
Thank you, I missed that
GrapheneOS doesn’t ship with any Google services by default. We do provide an easy and safe way to install the Google Play components if desired, they are run under the same sandbox and constraints as any other ordinary app you install. Because they expect privileged access that they don’t get on GrapheneOS, we add a compatibility layer that essentially teaches them to work under the normal circumstances that is the sandbox. If you don’t want them you don’t have to do anything, they are not present in that case.
LineageOS does make connections to Google by default, as does AOSP. GrapheneOS changes those connections while LineageOS doesn’t. They can be viewed here:
https://eylenburg.github.io/android_comparison.htm
Keep in mind, that table isn’t exhaustive. It lists the regular connections AOSP makes and how each OS handles them, but doesn’t include information on any additional connections that occur.
You can absolutely download apps from F-Droid on GrapheneOS, what makes you think you can’t, and how did you conclude that LineageOS is more private and secure?
LineageOS is pretty commonly behind on updates. As an example, it seems that LineageOS 21 (based on Android 14 QPR1) came out in February of this year.
https://9to5google.com/2024/03/12/lineageos-21-review/
You cannot ship the full security patches without being on the latest version of Android, which is Android 14 QPR3 now. Of course, if the device is EOL, that’s doubtly the case, and no OS can fix that.
I don’t know if this was the case in 2019, but it certainly isn’t the case now. On GrapheneOS, you have the choice of using the GrapheneOS server for the internet connectivity check, changing it to Google’s server or even disabling it altogether.
I never said that GrapheneOS couldn’t download apps from F-Droid. I didn’t mention GrapheneOS being able to use F-Droid in my dot points but that was just an oversight, not intenttional.
The problem with this is that so many apps use Google Play Services. If I didn’t want a phone that used Google, I wouldn’t use an OS that bent backwards to make it work.
The sandbox model is OK in theory, except when your bank app asks for permissions for microphone, camera, contacts and files, and refuses to start without them.
The app model is a bit broken IMO and GrapheneOS both enables and perpetuates it.
I might be being a bit naïve here, but Android 14 came out in October, 4 months prior to LOS 21, which is not particularly long. Android 13 is still supported by upstream. This sounds a bit like running RHEL or Debian vs bleeding edge Arch, no? It’s a common debate whether RHEL systems are constantly out of date, the counterargument being that vulnerabilities are often found in new software versions. Without real statistics about security vulnerabilities over time it’s difficult to make an informed decision about software version policies.
That is excellent, I’m glad to hear GrapheneOS is changing some of the defaults to be a bit better.
GrapheneOS doesn’t “bend backwards” to make apps relying on Play Services work. Sandboxed Google Play is highly compatible and all you need to do is install the apps, just like you would any other apps. The argument that since many apps require Google Play Services, you should use stock OS where they have privileged access rather than being sandboxed doesn’t make a lot of sense.
Apps installed on operating systems that don’t have a sandbox and thus a permission model get access to straight up everything. Your scenario is exactly why GrapheneOS features contact and storage scopes; as an alternative to the regular permissions for more granular control. You can grant an app only a subset of contacts/files or nothing at all, the app won’t complain since on its end, everything’s been supposedly granted. There are more planned features to address other permissions in a similar way. Furthermore you could put it in its own little box via a secondary profile (you can have up to 32), and have that only run when you need it.
4 months without proper patches to known vulnerabilities is very long. Previous versions of Android aren’t properly supported; they only receive a subset of patches, not nearly everything. In fact, not even Android 14 is currently getting full patches. At the time of writing, for a device to be properly patched, it must be on Android 14 QPR3. It’s why we put great care in porting everything over as quickly as possible. You don’t have to make guesses about vulnerabilities, you can simply look at all of the known vulnerabilities that haven’t been patched yet, or will never be patched, in previous Android versions. It’s not a matter of “what if”, it’s what’s actually happening.